Balfour Beatty’s slogan for its transformation programme is “Build to Last”. But, given the politically contentious and unprepossessing constructs it wants to build, some might hope it doesn’t mean that too literally.

Among the potential “landmark contracts” deemed landscape blots by campaigners are the HS2 rail link, the Hinkley Point C nuclear power station, and a potash mine on the North York Moors national park. Balfour, which these days makes almost half of its revenue from the US, has even been linked — erroneously, it says — with that ultimate divider of opinions and former trading nations: President Donald Trump’s Mexican border wall.

Shareholders will not be among those manning barricades or wielding placards, though. To them, Balfour’s interest in lucrative eyesores demonstrates a much-needed return to disciplined bidding and risk pricing. In fact, when the group pulled out of a London apartment development by award-winning architects KPF, analysts cheered. They had good reason: the bidding discipline they detect in grey buildings has returned to Balfour to the black — after two years of losses, seven profit warnings and a failed takeover by Carillion. Under phase one of chief executive Leo Quinn’s transformation programme, which began in February 2015, the shares have risen by almost a third, to 273.5p — and there are still a couple of phases to go.

Phase two — now that 90 per cent of lossmaking contracts have been completed, and 45 acquisitions integrated — is to return to “industry-standard” profit margins. Given that these are only 1-3 per cent in UK and US construction, it does not sound too challenging. However, to improve margins will require accurate pricing of all future contract risks, including political risk, when bidding. And in infrastructure, where Mr Quinn sees the opportunity, political risk is hard to measure and control. Road and rail projects — to say nothing of walls — can be delayed, adjusted and rerouted by agencies that need not answer to shareholders.

Balfour Beatty will either have to price that risk perfectly — or leave it with customers. Neither task, as pollsters will attest, will be easy.

Unilever’s short-term fix

Unilever dismissed Kraft-Heinz’s approach as the embodiment of short-termism, with the tacit backing of its long-term holders, writes Kate Burgess.

Now, chief executive Paul Polman, previously a firm opponent of share buybacks, is holding his nose and thinking of raising debt to repurchase Unilever shares and froth up earnings per share. As a short-term ploy to appease those who might have aligned themselves with Kraft-Heinz, it might work. But it may get up the noses of Unilever’s most loyal backers, who fret that repurchases are an unimaginative use of company funds that mainly sweeten executives’ pay packages.

Larry Fink, boss of BlackRock which is Unilever’s biggest shareholder, warned in January that the US habit of repurchasing stock was an indication that companies were “succumbing to the pressures of short-termism in place of constructive, long-term strategies”.

His words echo research from McKinsey, the consultants, that shows share buybacks rarely prop up share prices for long and do little in the long run for shareholder returns. Companies that generate enough cash to buy back shares can usually put it to better uses, says McKinsey. Investing at an attractive return on capital will always create more value over time than repurchasing shares.

Unilever has an honourable history in earning sector-beating returns on capital. It would be a shame if it jeopardised those returns — particularly by borrowing to pay short-term investors for their shares. It is time to take a deep breath.

Warren Buffett, the investment sage who was part of the raiding party for Unilever, said last month that those who portray buybacks as “un-American . . . corporate misdeeds that divert funds needed for productive endeavours,” are wrong. “When a company grows and outstanding shares shrink, good things happen for shareholders,” he said. But company bosses must simply resist the urge to overvalue their businesses and buy back stock at silly prices. As Mr Buffett also noted: “What is smart at one price, is stupid at another.” Sage words indeed.

Cunning plan for Fox

With a 39 per cent stake in both 21st Century Fox and News Corp, the Murdoch family needs to convince regulators that Fox buying Sky will not give it undue influence. And it would appear to have two killer arguments: thanks to the internet, there is now lots of healthy competition for Fox’s particular brand of journalism; and online readership of News Corp titles is helpfully not offsetting their declining circulations. Talk about taking strength from weakness.

matthew.vincent@ft.com

Buybacks: kate.burgess@ft.com